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THE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ORIGINS OF 
CHAPTER 11: AN ESSAY ON THE UNWRITTEN LAW OF 
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS 
Douglas G. Baird* 
It might be possible to have a law of corporate reorganizations in which a 
judge or bureaucrat imposed a new capital structure by fiat, but our law of 
corporate reorganizations relies on creditors (and the professionals who work 
for them) to sit down at a conference table and forge a new capital structure 
themselves. The law’s ambition is to make these negotiations possible. In large 
part for this reason, the way the Bankruptcy Code (Code) operates cannot be 
easily reconciled with conventional understandings of how statutes are supposed 
to work.  
Negotiations are the lifeblood of bankruptcy practice, but the Code says little 
about how they are to be conducted. Instead, the bankruptcy judge enforces a set 
of largely unwritten rules.1 Some logrolling and give-and-take are permissible, 
while other sorts of side deals are out of bounds. These are well-known to 
insiders, but largely invisible to those on the outside. This essay explores how 
reorganization’s unwritten rules have evolved and tries to make sense of them. 
Rather than a dispenser of Solomonic wisdom, the bankruptcy judge is like 
a referee. A good referee ensures that the rules of the game are followed. Some 
rules are set out with mechanical precision, but many others are not. 
Negotiations must be kept on track, and doing this requires enforcing principles 
that lie within the interstices of the Code. These unwritten rules have developed 
over time, and they grow out of a small handful of ideas that emerged in the 
early days of the republic. 
 
 * Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School. This essay 
sounds themes on the history of corporate reorganizations that echo those in a larger work that will appear soon. 
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE UNWRITTEN LAW OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS (forthcoming 2021). Many of the 
ideas presented here were first developed in work with Tony Casey, Ed Morrison, Randy Picker, and most 
especially Bob Rasmussen, and I am much indebted to them. I am also grateful to the Frank Greenberg Fund for 
research support. 
 1 Experienced restructuring professionals might claim that many of the rules I characterize as 
“unwritten” can be derived from reported opinions. One can argue that, to this extent, they are not “unwritten.” 
Fair enough. Even here, however, it is a mistake to think that the law is especially accessible to outsiders. For 
example, professionals commonly invoke In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004), for the idea that 
debtors have the ability to pay critical vendors, and they point to Committee of Equity Security Holders v. Lionel 
Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983), for the idea that going-concern sales are permissible. This would 
come as a surprise to someone who was not part of the restructuring world, as the two opinions explicitly forbid 
the practices under the facts before them, and Kmart does not even allow that paying critical vendors is ever 
possible.  
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I. JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT AND THE STATUTE OF 13 ELIZ 
The key question in the law of corporate reorganizations is one of construing 
the inherent power of the court to oversee the process. This equitable power 
derives from a general principle that was already deeply embedded in the law by 
the end of the eighteenth century: debtors cannot make transfers with the intent 
to “hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors.2  
“Hinder, delay, or defraud” first appeared in a statute Parliament passed in 
1571, the thirteenth reginal year of Queen Elizabeth.3 This statute came to be 
cited in American courts as shorthand for the court’s equitable power to review 
a distressed debtor’s transfer of property. Eventually, these principles would be 
extended to crafting plans of reorganization in an equity receivership.4 At the 
outset, however, the statute reached only the most obvious abuses.  
In the first instance, the Statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5 was aimed at sham 
transactions.5 A debtor attempts to thwart creditors by pretending to transfer 
assets to friends or relatives before absconding. The debtor plans to return and 
enjoy the assets once again once creditors lose interest. The statute was always 
understood to give the court the power to void such transfers, empowering 
creditors to seize the assets from the friend or relative just as if they were still in 
the hands of the debtor.6 
The statute’s reach, however, soon expanded beyond merely prohibiting out-
and-out fraudulent transfers. The first inflection point came in Twyne’s Case in 
1602.7 Twyne’s Case held that, in addition to transactions involving actual fraud, 
the Statute of 13 Eliz. empowered the court to strike down any transactions that 
had “badges of fraud.”8 Badges of fraud came to be understood as indicia that a 
transaction was not an arm’s-length deal in the marketplace.9 A transaction was 
done secretly. There was no reasonably equivalent value. There was no physical 
transfer of assets. A transaction did not serve an economic purpose. Such 
 
 2 E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2019). 
 3 Statute of Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571). 
 4 See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) (“The findings of the District Court, amply supported 
by the evidence, reveal a scheme to defraud creditors reminiscent of some of the evils with which 13 Eliz. c. 5 
was designed to cope.”). 
 5 See Statute of Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571). 
 6 See id. 
 7 For a brilliant analysis of the case and the circumstances out of which it arose, see Emily Kadens, New 
Light on Twyne’s Case, 94 AM. BANKR. L.J. (forthcoming 2020). 
 8 See GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§61–61e (Baker, Voorhis & 
Co. rev. ed. 1940). 
 9 See id. 
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transactions and many others possessed badges of fraud.10 A transaction could 
“hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors even when there was no proof of the deceit 
that is essential to bringing an action for common law fraud.11  
Over time, courts acquired the ability to review any transaction and decide 
whether it violated the rights of creditors.12 It was already plain by the end of 
the eighteenth century that a transaction was not insulated from scrutiny merely 
because a third party acted with the debtor entirely in good faith. In the 1770s, 
Lord Mansfield, the greatest commercial law judge of his (or perhaps any) era, 
confronted a case that raised the question of whether creditors could challenge a 
transaction in which the only property that left the debtor’s hands went to a third 
party who acted entirely honorably.13  
The case involved a person who loaned a friend a large amount of money in 
order to help him sort out his business affairs.14 Just a few days after he received 
the loan, however, the friend realized that he could no longer save his business.15 
The friend returned the money and then fled to France.16 The creditors started a 
bankruptcy proceeding and sought to recover the repayment.17 The loan had 
been made in good faith, and the lender’s behavior was impeccable.18 But Lord 
Mansfield held that this payment was void nevertheless.19  
In the case before him, Lord Mansfield willingly conceded, the creditor was 
“very meritorious.”20 But this was of no moment. Allowing debtors to pick and 
choose among creditors when bankruptcy is imminent undermines the 
bankruptcy process, as bankruptcy is a regime in which assets are distributed pro 
rata. A transfer a debtor makes just before absconding therefore bears a badge 
of fraud. There is no actual fraud, but such a preferential payment nevertheless 
“hinders, delays, and defrauds” other creditors within the meaning of the Statute 
of 13 Eliz. 
 
 10 As Justice Cardozo explained in Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U.S. 348, 354 (1932), “A conveyance is illegal 
if made with an intent to defraud the creditors of the grantor, but equally it is illegal if made with an intent to 
hinder and delay them.” 
 11 See id. 
 12 Burd v. Smith, 4 Dall. 76 (1802). 
 13 See Harman v. Fishar, 98 Eng. Rep. 998 1 Cowp. 118, 122 (1774). 
 14 Id. at 998. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 1000. 
 19 Id. at 1001. 
 20 Id. at 1000. 
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Lord Mansfield’s case, Harman v. Fishar, was connected with an impending 
bankruptcy, and it provided the wellspring for the power the trustee enjoys today 
to recover payments made to creditors on the eve of bankruptcy.21 But the 
reasoning in the case was not limited to transfers made when bankruptcy is 
imminent. The case also established a more general principle. Financially 
distressed debtors had to cut square corners. A payment of a completely 
legitimate debt could violate the rights of creditors, even if no bankruptcy was 
in the offing.22  
A case involving a financer whose fortunes collapsed in the 1790s shows the 
reach of this principle. Blair McClenachan transferred his land to several men to 
hold in trust for the benefit of his creditors.23 On the face of it, McClenachan, 
far from evading creditors, was putting in place a mechanism to pay them. 
Moreover, the Court found that the facts “acquit Mr. McClenachan of any 
intentional, or mental, fraud.”24  
Most significantly, in distinct contrast to the case before Lord Mansfield, 
McClenachan was not trying to distort bankruptcy’s rule of pro rata distribution 
as there was no bankruptcy law in place in the United States at the time.25 In 
assessing McClenachan’s behavior, the court recognized that, in the absence of 
a bankruptcy law, a preference, even when a debtor is distressed, was 
unobjectionable.26  
Nevertheless, the Court found that the transfer of land was ineffective.27 
Various things McClenachan failed to do—such as call a meeting of his creditors 
or create a schedule of his assets or make some of the creditors trustees or explain 
to them how he would go about distributing the assets—suggested that 
McClenachan set up the trust as a way to defeat those who were about to secure 
judgments against him.28 There were enough badges of fraud to require voiding 
the transaction. McClenachan could not purport to create a vehicle for paying 
off some creditors if he did it in order to undermine the rights of other creditors.29 
 
 21 See 11 U.S.C. §547 (2019). For the canonical analysis of the evolution of preference law, see Robert 
Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. 
L. REV. 3 (1986).  
 22 See Harman, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1001. 
 23 Burd v. Smith, 4 Dall. 76 (1802). 
 24 Id. at 86. 
 25 The transfer took place in September 1797, and Congress did not pass its first bankruptcy statute until 
1800. See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). 
 26 Burd, 4 Dall. at 86–87. 
 27 Id. at 87–88. 
 28 Id. at 93. 
 29 Id. at 89. 
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As one of the justices explained: 
I cannot conceive [anything] more dangerous, than to sanction by a 
judicial determination, a deed of this description. It will be vesting the 
debtor with unlimited power at all times over his property, to baffle his 
creditors, under the specious pretext of paying them.30 
This case is one of the earliest instantiations of the idea that assignments for 
the benefit of creditors are themselves subject to judicial scrutiny. The judge has 
a general mandate to assess the conduct of the parties engaged in such 
transactions and look for badges of fraud. The judge has the power to strike 
down transactions that are designed to undermine the rights of one or more of 
the creditors.  
The Supreme Court applied this principle to an equity receivership—the 
most direct predecessor to modern chapter 11—in Chicago, Rock Island & 
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Howard in 1868.31 The Mississippi & Missouri Railroad 
was hopelessly insolvent.32 By all accounts, there was not enough value to pay 
its senior creditors in full.33 The senior creditors wanted to foreclose on the 
railroad’s assets and sell them to a third party, but those in control of the railroad 
could put numerous obstacles in their way.34  
The senior creditors wanted to clear a smooth path to a sale so they reached 
a deal with those who controlled the debtor.35 The senior creditors agreed to give 
some of the proceeds of the sale to those in control of the railroad in return for 
their promise of cooperation.36 The buyer of the railroad would pay most of the 
consideration to the senior creditors, but some would go to the shareholders of 
the old corporation.37 Meanwhile, the general creditors of the old corporation 
would be left with nothing.38 
The Supreme Court had little difficulty finding that the general creditors of 
the Mississippi & Missouri were entitled to the proceeds that the buyer of the 
railroad was to give to the old shareholders.39 The money the buyer promised to 
the shareholders was in the first instance an asset of the corporation, and, as 
 
 30 Id. at 89. 
 31 See R.R. Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392 (1868). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 415–16. 
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between the shareholders and the general creditors, the general creditors were 
entitled to the corporation’s assets first.40 To be sure, the case would have been 
utterly different if the senior creditors had foreclosed without any help from the 
shareholders. The amount realized from the foreclosure sale would not have 
been enough to pay the senior creditors in full, and hence these senior creditors 
could have kept all of it. But matters changed when they brought the debtor into 
the picture. Any proceeds of the sale that did not go to the senior creditors had 
to go first to the creditors of the debtor.41  
To understand the breadth of the principle at work, it is important to see that 
the same problem would arise if the transaction had been structured differently. 
Assume that, instead of the buyer agreeing to pay part of the consideration for 
the railroad to the old senior creditors and the other part to the old shareholders, 
the buyer had promised to give the entire consideration to the senior creditors, 
and the senior creditors then made a separate promise to the shareholders to 
share some of it with them.  
Because the senior creditors were owed more than the value of the land, they 
were entitled to the entire consideration received from the sale. Once they had 
it, they were, it might seem, free to give any part of it to whomever they pleased. 
There would be no property of the debtor that flowed to the shareholders and 
skipped the creditors. But this should make no difference. As the case involving 
Blair McClenachan illustrated, courts had long established that even legal 
processes that were otherwise regularly conducted could be reviewed for badges 
of fraud.42 It was enough that the debtor was involved in a process in which some 
creditors were paid and others were not.43  
 
 40 Id. 
 41 The Supreme Court relied in Howard on Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435 (No. 17,944), 437–39 
(C.C.D. Me. 1824). For an excellent account of this case, see Norwood P. Beveridge Jr., Does a Corporation’s 
Board of Directors Owe a Fiduciary Duty to Its Creditors?, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 589, 595–600 (1994). In Wood, 
Justice Story held that the capital of a corporation that was liquidating was held by the corporation in trust for 
the benefit of the creditors. Wood is usually regarded as an evolutionary dead end. Its conception of invested 
capital as being held by the corporation in trust is out of step with modern thinking about corporate law. But the 
trust language in Wood is something of a red herring. The finding that there was a trust worked no special magic. 
To be sure, the business was solvent at the time of the distribution, but leakage of value to shareholders when a 
corporation is wrapping up is itself a badge of fraud. It requires no notions of trust law to find that distributions 
from a liquidating firm to its shareholders that put its ability to pay creditors at risk are problematic. Bruce 
Markell underscores this point in his masterful discussion of the evolution of the absolute priority rule. See Bruce 
A. Markell, Owners, Auctions and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 74–
77 (1991); see also Jerome N. Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization, 
19 VA. L. REV. 541, 569 (1933). 
 42 See Burd v. Smith, 4 Dall. 76 (1802). 
 43 Id. at 88. 
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It is the process as a whole that is subject to scrutiny. Courts had the power 
to review everything that went on. If square corners were cut, all was well and 
good. But if the entire process was in any way irregular, the court could strike it 
down. It was the assignment, the receivership, or any other procedure involving 
a debtor and its creditors as a whole, not any particular transfer to or from the 
debtor that was subject to oversight. But exactly what sort of oversight was 
appropriate in the specific context of a corporate reorganization took time to 
work out. 
II. A SEAT AT THE TABLE 
The equity receivership took the same form as an assignment for the benefit 
of creditors. In both cases, assets were put up for sale. The sale in an equity 
receivership, however, was largely a fiction. The holders of the senior securities 
would credit bid their claims. After the “sale,” the senior protective committee 
owned all the assets of the railroad.44 In theory, the senior committee could do 
with them whatever it pleased, but in virtually every case the senior committee 
promised in advance to give some shares in the reorganized railroad to junior 
stakeholders who participated in the reorganization.  
The standard equity receivership is not so different from what happened in 
Howard. In both cases, there is a sale and the old shareholders ended up with a 
stake in the firm while some of the creditors were left out in the cold. It might 
seem that if Howard possessed badges of fraud, the typical equity receivership 
did as well. Many equity receiverships, however, proceeded without much 
thought given to distinguishing them from Howard.  
The lawyers for investment bankers who orchestrated the receiverships 
dismissed the idea that they bore badges of fraud out of hand. Victor Morawetz, 
the preeminent reorganization lawyer at the predecessor firm to Cravath, 
addressed exactly this question in the treatise he wrote on corporate law.45 In his 
treatise, Morawetz drew a sharp distinction between two sorts of transactions. If 
a corporate debtor transferred assets to a new entity in a manner that effected a 
fraud on the rights of the existing creditors, then the existing creditors could, of 
course, reach the assets in the new corporation.46 On the other hand, if the assets 
were sold outright in good faith to a new entity, then the creditors of the old 
 
 44 See Howard, 74 U.S. 392; Burd, 4 Dall. 76. 
 45 See VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2d. ed. 1886). 
 46 See id. at 779–921. 
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corporation could look only to the proceeds of the sale that the old corporation 
received.47 Equity receiverships are transactions of the second sort.48 
Morawetz’s position in his treatise was not on its face different from that of 
Lord Mansfield or even the court reviewing McClenachan’s maneuvering once 
one concluded that equity receivership was a transaction done without badges of 
fraud. But this merely states the conclusion. Morawetz argued that that badges 
of fraud were absent because an equity receivership was completely above 
board.49 A reorganization in which the stakeholders formed committees and 
negotiated with each other and agreed on a plan was completely transparent.50 
As long as the sale was done under the auspices of a court and the debtor had 
not engaged in mischief, it was entirely unobjectionable.51 Indeed, because the 
receivership put the business back on a sound footing and the value of 
everyone’s stake remained the same, this process, far from bearing badges of 
fraud, was entirely salutary.52 
In the typical railroad receivership, the only ones given a seat at the 
bargaining table were those stakeholders who were to be part of the business 
going forward. If the reorganized railroad was not going to use a spur line that 
was owned by a wholly owned subsidiary, the creditors of that subsidiary could 
be left out, even if the parent corporation had guaranteed the loans. To be sure, 
the guarantees did make the subsidiary’s bondholders junior creditors of the 
parent. But the senior bondholders who bought the railroad at the foreclosure 
sale with a credit bid had no legal obligation to share the proceeds with those 
junior to them, and their norms required them to share only with those who had 
invested in the assets of the railroad that were to stay with the business.  
The bondholders of these subsidiaries who were frozen out sometimes 
complained. When they did, they invoked the same fraudulent conveyance 
principles that the creditors of Blair McClenachan and the Mississippi & 
Missouri invoked. These creditors lost in the lower courts. Courts deferred to the 
investment bankers and other professionals in deciding whether a particular 
creditor was entitled to participate in the reorganization. There was nothing 
objectionable about a reorganization plan “unless it can be said that it was a 
scheme to defraud creditors.”53 There were no badges of fraud when 
 
 47 See id. 
 48 See id. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See id. 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. 
 53 Paton v. N. Pac. R. Co., 85 F. 838, 842 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1896). 
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professionals were negotiating with investors who were part of the railroad’s 
future and leaving out those who were not. The transaction was designed to 
restore the railroad to sound financial health. In doing this, the investment 
bankers and professionals exercised their best judgment about the sensible 
boundaries of the firm going forward. 
Judges supervise the reorganization, but judges do not dictate the outcome 
of the bargaining. The creditors craft a plan according to whatever norms 
constrain them. The court does not intervene as long as there is nothing 
underhanded about the way the plan is forged. Among other things, the court is 
simply not competent to craft details of a plan of reorganization. In an equity 
receivership, investment bankers and other professionals did the heavy lifting, 
and they had the incentive to do right by the stakeholders as a group.  
That the bondholders of the subsidiary had formal legal rights against the 
railroad before the receivership began was neither here nor there. As a technical 
matter, they were junior to the senior bondholders who bid at the foreclosure 
sale. In the absence of any topping bid, they had no legal right to receive 
anything. Hence, they had nothing to complain about when they received only 
what the norms of the investment bankers allowed. And as far as the norms of 
the investment bankers were concerned, the subsidiary was not part of the firm 
on a going-forward basis, so its bondholders were not entitled to share in the 
value of the reorganized firm. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, however, the Supreme Court muddied 
the waters. Before it came the receivership of the Louisville, New Albany & 
Chicago Railway Company, commonly known as the Monon.54 The railway had 
guaranteed bonds of a subsidiary.55 The bondholders of the subsidiary sought to 
hold the parent to the guarantee, but before they could vindicate their rights in 
court, the railway persuaded a general creditor to put it into receivership.56 There 
was a foreclosure sale, and the claims of the bondholders on their guarantee were 
wiped out.57 
The Supreme Court refused to uphold the sale.58 It remanded to the lower 
court to see if the receivership was a scheme to defeat the rights of general 
 
 54 See Louisville Tr. Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. R. Co., 174 U.S. 674 (1899). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 682. 
 57 Id. at 683–84. 
 58 Id. at 688–89. 
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creditors.59 If it was, the sale could not stand.60 The Court found that the lower 
court had not given the railway’s reorganization plan the kind of scrutiny that 
was required.61 Once judges are called upon to oversee a receivership, they 
cannot be idle spectators. They have to ensure that the receivership is not part of 
a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. In its view, a judge should “never 
rightfully become the mere silent registrar of the agreements . . . .”62  
In its opinion, the Court held that judges must draw a distinction between 
the right of the senior bondholder “who has acquired absolute title by foreclosure 
to mortgaged property to thereafter give of his interest to others”63 and an 
illegitimate attempt on the part of the senior bondholder “to destroy the interest 
of all unsecured creditors, to secure a waiver of all objections on the part of the 
stockholder, and consummate speedily the foreclosure . . . .”64 
This case left professionals like Morawetz uneasy, but they believed Monon 
distinguishable from the typical equity receivership. The Monon went through 
the receivership only because the parent corporation was trying to thwart the 
bondholders of a subsidiary who held guarantees. A transfer, even to a 
completely legitimate creditor, can be struck down if the purpose of the 
transaction is to thwart the rights of other creditors. The court held this in Burd 
v. Smith, and Morawetz said as much in his treatise.65 Morawetz pointed to the 
motive behind the actions of the debtor in Monon to set it apart from the standard 
reorganization.66 Monon involved a deliberate effort to thwart a creditor group. 
The typical equity receivership did not. Monon might require courts to give 
greater scrutiny to reorganization plans, but this did not work a sea change. It 
was one thing to insist on giving the reorganization process greater scrutiny to 
ensure that it was not a scheme to deprive creditors of their rights and quite 
another to intrude into responsible decision-making by investment bankers and 
other professionals. 
The standard equity receiverships were not begun in order to freeze anyone 
out. The railroads that entered into receiverships would do so whether or not 
there were subsidiary bondholders with guarantees against the parent. If there 
were such bondholders, the treatment they received would be a consequence of 
 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See Burd v. Smith, 4 Dall. 76 (1802); MORAWETZ, supra note 44; Louisville T.R. Co., 174 U.S. 674. 
 66 MORAWETZ, supra note 44; see Louisville T.R. Co., 174 U.S. 674. 
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charting the best course for the railroad going forward. If the subsidiary was to 
be part of the railroad going forward, these bondholders would be part of the 
negotiations. But if those in control of the reorganization decided that, as a sound 
business matter, a particular stretch of track did not belong inside the firm, then 
the investors in that line were out of luck. This was as it should be. If the business 
no longer included the assets in which the bondholders invested, they were not 
part of its future. Hence, they were not entitled to a seat at the bargaining table.  
It was against this background that the Supreme Court’s most important 
equity receivership case, Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd, must be read. 
The creditor who complained was not an investor at all, but rather the assignee 
of an unpaid supplier.67 He took more than a decade to establish his claim against 
a spur line.68 More to the point, he had not been harmed by the reorganization.69 
The receivership had been regularly conducted, and the assets were found to be 
insufficient to pay the senior creditors in full.70 None of the value that the secured 
creditors chose to give to the old shareholders was tainted with any badge of 
fraud.71 
The Boyd Court did not deny that the senior creditors could do with their 
share in the railroad what they pleased, but this argument was not a 
showstopper.72 The foreclosure sale, as everyone knew, was just a legal device 
to allow bargaining to take place under a judicial umbrella. As long as the 
shareholders were participating, the courts had to ensure that the process rights 
of every creditor were respected. As soon as the senior creditors started 
bargaining with the shareholders, they lost the ability to ignore general creditors. 
It is not enough merely to examine the intent of those participating in the 
reorganization process. It is irrelevant that the purpose of the reorganization was 
not to freeze out creditors like Boyd. Those in charge had no right to pick and 
choose who to include in the negotiations. Everyone had a right to a seat at the 
table. 
The equitable principle that the court invoked against McClenachan had 
evolved by the time of Boyd. The courts no longer looked merely at whether the 
debtor was trying to thwart creditors. It did not matter whether the motive behind 
the transaction was bad. In order for a reorganization to alter the rights of 
 
 67 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913). 
 68 Id.  
 69 Id.  
 70 Id.  
 71 Id.  
 72 Id. at 510. 
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creditors, the affected creditors had to be given a chance to come to the 
bargaining table and participate in the reorganization process. Referees must 
ensure all the players can enter onto the field.  
Boyd is sometimes singled out as a harbinger of the absolute priority rule, 
but this fundamentally misunderstands what it was about. The Court did not 
mandate that Boyd receive any particular substantive entitlement. Boyd, like 
everyone else, would receive whatever emerged from the bargaining process. As 
the Court explained, “If [a general creditor] declines a fair offer he is left to 
protect himself as any other creditor of a judgment debtor, and, having refused 
to come into a just reorganization, could not thereafter be heard in a court of 
equity to attack it.”73  
Boyd is not about priority rights or the distribution of property from the 
estate. Instead, it continues a long line of cases that focus on the sort of oversight 
that a judge must give to a reorganization. Before Boyd, a consensus among 
professionals had emerged that the judge’s job was merely to ensure that those 
engaged in the plan formation process were not intentionally trying to undermine 
other creditors. In Boyd, the Court made it clear that this was not enough. A 
judge supervising a reorganization had an affirmative obligation to ensure that 
everyone had a chance to participate in the bargaining process on fair terms.74 A 
failure to do this would give excluded creditors the ability to invoke fraudulent 
conveyance principles. 
The Supreme Court in Boyd, however, left open the question of what it 
means to participate in the bargaining process and how the judge should go about 
policing the behavior of the parties to the negotiations. The principles of 
fraudulent conveyance law that mandated the scrutiny were still evolving, and 
they went through tectonic changes with the arrival of the New Deal. 
III. THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN BANKRUPTCY JUDGE 
Two reorganization scholars from the Yale Law School came to Washington 
to help implement the New Deal, and they brought with them their own distinct 
conception of the law. William O. Douglas and Jerome Frank were young Turks 
who set themselves apart of the white shoe crowd on Wall Street. They did not 
trust investment bankers and their lawyers to do right by investors. Central to 
their conception of reorganizations was the steady hand that the judge was to 
 
 73 Id. at 508. 
 74 See id. at 482. 
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hold on the tiller. Frank himself identified Howard as the seminal case that 
captured the way that fraudulent conveyance principles animated the law.75  
The lawyers who succeeded Morawetz continued to believe that judges 
should only ensure that there was no deceit or underhanded dealings by the 
debtor.76 By their account, Boyd did not fundamentally change the landscape. It 
merely ensured that everyone had a seat at the table. William O. Douglas and 
his fellow New Dealers disagreed. They believed that judges should do more. 
They should hold the reins and direct the process. Those who negotiated with 
one another in a corporate reorganization could not be trusted to bargain in such 
a way that everyone’s interest was protected. In the case of the reorganization of 
large firms, one had to be especially wary of the risk that, left to their own 
devices, insiders systematically harmed small public investors. The judge had to 
apply the principles of the Statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5 more aggressively, insist on 
full disclosure, and be quick to act if the potential for advantage-taking arose.  
Douglas and Frank believed that the judge had broad powers, an idea 
Douglas articulated after he was appointed to the Supreme Court in Pepper v. 
Litton.77 The judge’s powers had to be “invoked to the end that fraud will not 
prevail, that substance will not give way to form, that technical considerations 
will not prevent substantial justice from being done.” Hence, “[i]n the exercise 
of its equitable jurisdiction the bankruptcy court has the power to sift the 
circumstances surrounding any claim to see that injustice or unfairness is not 
done in administration of the bankrupt estate.”78 
Douglas and Frank both believed that bankruptcy judges should be broadly 
empowered—whether by designating votes, subordinating claims, disallowing 
claims, or otherwise sanctioning the parties—to do what was necessary to ensure 
that parties bargained in good faith. The judge had to protect the integrity of the 
process. To do this, judges had to know what was going on. Hence, disclosure 
was the first obligation of participants in the reorganization process, but only the 
first. 
 
 75 See Frank, supra note 40, at 541–43. 
 76 Morawetz left his firm to become general counsel of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway. To 
continue the firm’s reorganization practice, his partners turned to a young associate to fill the void. His name 
was Paul Cravath. 
 77 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). Pepper was a case that involved only prepetition misconduct 
by a creditor, but Douglas used the case as a vehicle to announce a principle that extended to actions undertaken 
in the reorganization itself.  
 78 Id. at 307–08.  
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We have emphasized that full disclosure is the minimum requirement 
in order not to imply that it is the limit of the power and duty of the 
bankruptcy court in these situations.79 
There are a number of provisions of the Code and the Bankruptcy Rules that 
mandate disclosure, but the unwritten rules ensure that they do not end there. 
Parties who fail to disclose a matter to the court do so at their peril, whether there 
is a provision of the Code that requires such disclosure or not. 
The bankruptcy judge, like any referee, must remain in control. Because they 
must make decisions on the basis of imperfect information, the judge can also 
impose limits on what parties can do, not because a particular behavior is 
necessarily bad, but because it reduces the risk of bad behavior that the judge 
cannot see or perhaps not understand. One of the most conspicuous signals that 
mischief might be afoot arises when one investor receives better treatment than 
others who seem similarly situated. Bankruptcy judges do not have to allow play 
to continue merely because they cannot point to any specific provision of the 
Code that has been violated.  
The policing power that William O. Douglas introduced into the law of 
corporate reorganizations emerges out of the old idea that creditors cannot 
manipulate legal processes to their own advantage. The spirit behind introducing 
this broad equitable power into reorganization law, however, is quite different 
from what came before. The equitable powers of the bankruptcy judge exist to 
ensure that the bargaining is done in a fashion that respects the rights of all.  
Exercising equitable powers to ensure that there is disclosure and that the 
players bargain in a way that comports with the unwritten rules is not the same 
as exercising equitable powers in a way that undermines the substantive rights 
of the parties. The modern bankruptcy judge has no power to do this. As one 
court has put it, the Code “does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create 
substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or 
constitute a roving commission to do equity.”80 Moreover, the unwritten rules 
do not allow for the bankruptcy judge to participate in the bargaining. The judges 
are referees, not players. They are in the arena, but they are not combatants. 
The drafters of the Code sought to create an environment in which it was 
easy for sophisticated professionals to bargain with one another and chart a 
course for the business that made sense. The managers of the old firm proposed 
 
 79 Am. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 145 (1940). 
 80 United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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a plan, and the senior creditors pushed back. Once they settled on a future for 
the business, the question was how to divide the pie. The senior creditors were 
willing to give ground because they wanted to resolve matters quickly and 
cheaply; the old shareholders and general creditors were willing to give ground 
because, in the end, the senior creditors as a class had the right to freeze them 
out. It was in the interests of all to find a middle ground.  
The law of corporate reorganizations needs to put in place a framework that 
made bargaining possible. In such bargaining, cooler heads will likely prevail, 
and as long as they do, economically viable firms will be able to reorganize 
successfully and their cash flows can be allocated as the dynamics of the 
bargaining dictated. As long as they employ able champions, a deal of some kind 
will be reached. To be sure, clients with the good fortune to retain a forceful 
lawyer might do better than others, but the exact terms of the deal are not as 
important as ensuring that some deal is made.  
Policing by the bankruptcy judge ensures that participants in the bargaining 
cannot use their position to further their outside interests. Nor can parties make 
side payments with a view to tilting the bankruptcy process in their favor. 
Nevertheless, in asserting their rights to the assets of the estate, creditors can 
choose the course that maximizes the value of their own stake in the firm. They 
are not fiduciaries of the estate.  
Determining exactly what actions are permissible, of course, is not always 
easy. Someone involved in negotiating a plan may make a transfer to another 
player during the course of bargaining and such a transfer might be permissible. 
In a perfect reorganization regime, the rules should prevent junior parties from 
invoking procedures that are wasteful and unnecessary, but it is likely impossible 
to create rules that work perfectly. As a result, a junior creditor may have the 
right to bring a procedural objection that is costly to defend against, but that adds 
little or no value to the estate as a whole. When a senior creditor who manifestly 
is owed more than the firm is worth wants to bring the reorganization process to 
a speedy conclusion, that creditor’s decision to pay money to someone junior to 
truncate unnecessary procedures may be appropriate.  
The amount of money tends to be small in the grand scheme of things. And 
it might not be troubling that the senior creditor is paying for professionals who 
work for others. The process is being run for the benefit of the senior creditor 
when it is owed more than the business is worth, so it is entirely sensible that the 
senior creditor pays for it. The senior creditor should be able to use what is, in 
effect, its own money to bring the case to a swift conclusion when the relevant 
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issues are plain for all to see. Such payments are analogous to settlements 
routinely made when civil litigation is settled. 
But it is an entirely different matter when creditors make side payments to 
tilt the playing field in its direction. When they do this in the course of trying to 
confirm a plan that is to their liking, courts prevent them by invoking the 
statutory mandate that a plan be “fair and equitable.” Finding an “anti-gifting” 
component in the terms “fair and equitable” can be securely linked to Boyd and 
other receivership cases. Courts invoke this power even when there is strong 
evidence that the senior creditor is owed more than the firm is worth. It nips 
mischievous side payments in the bud and helps ensure that the plan formation 
process is squeaky clean.81 It is a mistake, however, to limit the bankruptcy 
judge’s ability to police transactions to the narrow question of whether a plan is 
“fair and equitable” within the meaning of § 1129(b) of the Code.  
Imagine that a debtor has a senior lender, substantial priority tax claims, and 
a pool of general creditors. The debtor plans to auction the company. It soon 
appears that the senior creditor plans to credit-bid. No other buyers are on the 
horizon. Unless the creditors’ committee works hard to discover a flaw in the 
senior creditor’s lien, the senior creditor’s credit bid will be unchallenged. 
Negotiations between the committee and the secured creditor ensue. In return 
for the committee’s support of the auction, the senior creditor agrees to pay the 
professionals of the committee and provide several million dollars to the 
creditors’ committee for distribution to the general creditors.  
As expected, no one else appears at the auction and the senior creditor’s 
credit bid prevails. The senior creditor ends up with the business, the priority tax 
claims are left unpaid, and the general creditors end up with something (though 
the money they receive will come from the senior lenders, not from property of 
the estate).82  
All that may be at work is a tip. The senior creditor was not trying to prevent 
an auction that secured top dollar, but rather was striking a bargain that avoided 
unnecessary and costly procedures. On the other hand, these payments might be 
side payments that distort the process. The secured credit may have, in effect, 
paid the creditors’ committee to look the other way. Defects in the secured 
 
 81 The Second Circuit put it this way: “[I]f the parties here were less scrupulous or the bankruptcy court 
less vigilant, a weakened absolute priority rule could allow for serious mischief between senior creditors and 
existing shareholders.” DISH Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79, 
100 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 82 For a case with similar facts, see In re ICL Holding Co., Inc., 802 F.3d 547 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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creditors lien that might have come to light remain hidden. The payment to the 
creditors’ committee may have had the effect of short-circuiting the due 
diligence that a well-run reorganization sale process requires. The trick is 
distinguishing between legitimate tips that avoid unnecessary process and 
illegitimate side payments.  
Of course, the payment to the creditors’ committee does not prevent the tax 
collector from challenging the liens or finding other buyers, but not all parties 
are equally well-positioned to take an active role in the case. The government’s 
tax lawyers are not privy to the particulars of the business and lack expertise in 
reorganization. By contrast, the creditors’ committee has access to information 
about the debtor and the debtor’s business, and its professionals are used to the 
reorganization playing field. They are much better able to assess whether the 
senior creditor’s proposed auction would yield top dollar.  
Because the payment is coming from the pocket of the senior creditor, 
property of the estate and its equal division are not implicated. But this should 
make no difference. Side payments and bribes are bad whether a distribution is 
involved or not. The process as a whole is subject to judicial supervision. When 
the question is one of policing the behavior of creditors during the bankruptcy 
process, the judge is asking whether the overall negotiations were conducted in 
a fashion that could be trusted to maximize the value of the assets within the 
bankruptcy estate.  
It is important not to fixate on the question whether the mischief being done 
takes place as part of the confirmation process or whether the payment violates 
bankruptcy distribution rules. Protecting the bargaining environment rather than 
ensuring proper division of the assets is the task at hand. Ensuring that 
distributional rules are followed is necessary to do this and hence a necessary 
part of ensuring that the players follow the rules of the game, but it is hardly the 
only part. 
The bankruptcy judge’s ability to ensure the integrity of the reorganization 
process extends beyond transfers from one stakeholder to another. Imagine 
another case in which a senior creditor wants to buy the firm with a credit bid. 
The CEO, who ran the firm into the ground and who holds no equity in the firm, 
is still calling the shots while the firm is in chapter 11. The senior creditor 
suggests to the CEO that a going-concern sale is the best course for the firm. It 
tells the CEO how much it values her strategic vision and that it wants to keep 
the CEO on as a consultant if it proves the high bidder.  
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Should the general creditors be able to mount an objection to the going-
concern sale? There are two possible explanations for the secured creditor’s plan 
to retain the CEO as a consultant. The secured creditor may value the CEO’s 
acumen and be offering to pay her as it would anyone else who helps it run the 
business in the future. Alternatively, the secured creditor may be making the 
payment to the CEO so that, however dim-witted she might be, she understands 
the wisdom of allowing the secured creditor to obtain the firm at a bargain price. 
The judge is empowered to distinguish between these benign and the not-so-
benign possibilities. It can bless the transaction if the first explanation holds and 
prevent it in the case of the second. It is irrelevant that the CEO is not a 
stakeholder or that no property is being distributed from the estate. What matters 
is whether the side payment is being made because of the control the CEO 
exercises over the process. If the side payment is being made to obtain the 
cooperation of the CEO, the bankruptcy judge can refuse to allow the sale to 
proceed. The principle is the same as the one that prohibits class-skipping gifts, 
and it is a part of reorganization law. That the “fair and equitable” language of 
§ 1129(b) is not implicated is irrelevant. Nor does it matter that the principle 
itself appears nowhere in the Code. It is part of the unwritten law of corporate 
reorganizations. 
CONCLUSION 
In the first few decades of the Code, experienced reorganization 
professionals followed a set of norms that ensured that parties, notwithstanding 
their conflicting positions, would continue bargaining with each other. For 
example, it was understood that you never sent a threatening letter or filed an 
aggressive pleading without giving opposing counsel the courtesy of a telephone 
call first. When you stab someone in the reorganization arena, you stab them in 
the chest, not the back. Such norms helped keep the parties bargaining with each 
other, and these norms followed a few familiar patterns. While there were many 
possible deals, the players naturally gravitated toward only a few.83  
But many of these norms are evaporating, and old patterns of deal-making 
may no longer hold. In the new environment, with different players holding 
different stakes, there are no longer organized groups (like agented lenders or 
even creditors’ committees), but instead investors have “one-off” relationships 
 
 83 To cast things in the language of game theory, there were many possible equilibrium agreements, but 
comparatively few were focal points. For the classic discussion of focal points, see THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE 
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 57–58 (1960). 
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with the debtor entity (for example, counterparties with individual repos or 
swaps). The types of institutions vary—from banks and broker-dealers to hedge 
funds and private equity firms. The current environment is one in which there 
are no natural leaders (or followers) among the creditors to perform the shuttle 
diplomacy required to build a consensus. Without familiar benchmarks, there is 
no shared understanding of what form a plan should take. Coalition formation is 
harder.84  
The challenges of policing bargaining in this brave new world is what faces 
us today. Solving these challenges does not involve tinkering with the 
distributional rules of the Code. What appear to be departures from distributional 
rules may be completely innocuous efforts to acquire assets that do not belong 
to the estate—such as the good will of future customers. To acquire such good 
will, something the estate does not own, it may be appropriate to use assets of 
the estate to acquire it. The assets may be cash used to pay for an advertising 
campaign, but it may also be resources spent honoring warranties or frequent 
flyer miles.  
When the debtor pays prepetition creditors, it is possible (and often likely) 
that the payments are not being made to acquire benefits to which the debtor 
would otherwise have no right, but rather are side payments that distort 
negotiations. But to focus entirely on whether the transfer is to a prepetition 
creditor is wrong. Such a focus gives the false illusion that the distribution is the 
vice, rather than the corruption of the bargaining. Distributional irregularities are 
usually a symptom, not the disease. The prime directive is ensuring the integrity 
of the process.  
The law of corporate reorganizations provides a collective forum in which 
investors can work together to find a sensible capital structure for the business. 
The job of the bankruptcy judge is to police these negotiations and make sure 
that they are done according to Hoyle.85 This is reorganization law’s biggest 
 
 84 In the Adelphia reorganization, for example, infighting among at least twelve unofficial groups of 
creditors resulted in seven proposed reorganization plans, and professional fees and expenses initially sought by 
these twelve groups alone totaled more than $100 million. See Marshall S. Huebner & Benjamin A. Tisdell, As 
the Wheel Turns: New Dynamics in the Coming Restructuring Cycle, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, THE 
AMERICAS RESTRUCTURING AND INSOLVENCY GUIDE 2008/2009 77, 80 (2008), https://www.davispolk.com/ 
files/files/Publication/c054df87-9113-421d-9fa3-6c236f3c94c2/Preview/PublicationAttachment/84209c53-
2d67-4469-93f2-77ee307035e4/huebner.insol.america.as.the.wheel.turns.nov09.pdf. 
 85 Edmund Hoyle’s A Short Treatise on the Game of Whist (1742) established the rules by which everyone 
played the game. All games, including the game of corporate reorganizations, must be played according to 
Hoyle—that is, according to the specific rules that govern them, whether written or unwritten.  
In invoking Hoyle in the context the unwritten rules of corporate reorganization, I am echoing Thomas 
Ambro. One of the great commercial law judges of our time, Ambro once reversed a case on the ground that the 
BAIRD_7.15.20 7/16/2020 11:07 AM 
718 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 36 




unwritten doctrine of substantive consolidation had not been applied, in his words, “according to Hoyle.” See In 
re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 216 (3d Cir. 2005). Substantive consolidation could be done, he allowed, but 
not in the fashion it was done in the case before him. Rules are rules and must be followed, whether written or 
not. 
